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On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A038-576-174) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter Durling 
_______________ 
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June 26, 2012 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
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_______________ 
 
2 
 
Megan Bremer   [ARGUED] 
700 Light Street 
Baltimore, MD   21230 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
 
Jennifer R. Khouri   [ARGUED] 
Katherine Clark 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Tehram Steve Roye petitions for review of a final 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA” or the 
“Board”) ordering him removed from the United States based 
on his state-law convictions for aggravated assault and 
endangering the welfare of a child.  Roye asserts that he is 
entitled to deferral of removal under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because, if removed to 
his home country, he will likely be imprisoned and, with the 
consent or acquiescence of the Jamaican government, be 
subjected to torture by other prisoners and prison guards.  
Because the BIA erred in its review of Roye’s claims, we will 
grant his petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of 
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removal, and remand the matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
I. Background 
  
 Roye is a fifty-eight-year-old native of Jamaica, who 
was admitted to the United States on April 5, 1984 as the 
spouse of a U.S. citizen.  On April 30, 1992, he pled guilty in 
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas to committing an 
aggravated assault, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), 
and to endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of 18 
Pa. C.S.A. § 4304.  The amended information to which he 
pled alleged that he had “sexual intercourse … by forcible 
compulsion” with his eight-month old daughter.  
(Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 760.)  The trial judge 
sentenced Roye to a term of six to twenty years’ 
imprisonment but “strongly recommend[ed] that 
consideration be given to [his] immediate transfer into … [a] 
psychiatric [f]acility.”  (Id. at 763.)   
 
 Fourteen years after Roye pled guilty, the Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”), charging him as removable under INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he 
had been convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A). 
   
A. Roye’s Application for Deferral of Removal  
 
 Roye subsequently filed, on February 11, 2009, a Form 
I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 
seeking deferral of removal under the CAT.  On that form, 
Roye stated that he “fear[s] … rape and death if returned to 
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Jamaica,” and that his “mental illness gives rise to bizarre and 
criminal behavior that will make him a clear target for police 
officers and other inmates who sexually assault inmates with 
mental illnesses.”  (A.R. at 747.)   
 
 An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a hearing on 
May 26, 2009, during which Roye’s counsel presented three 
witnesses.1
 Nancy Anderson, an attorney who has practiced law in 
Jamaica and who was a member of the Independent Jamaican 
  Dr. Anne Weidman testified that, after examining 
Roye, she diagnosed him as having schizoaffective disorder, 
bipolar type.  She said that the nature of Roye’s condition was 
such that he would need to take medication for the remainder 
of his life, but she noted that Roye often refused to take 
medication “outside a treatment environment.”  (Id. at 298.)  
Dr. Weidman also observed that Roye suffered manic and 
depressive episodes, and “had incidents in which he set his 
cell on fire and … [became] very sexually preoccupied … .”  
(Id. at 299.) 
                                              
1 Roye did not testify during the May 26 hearing, 
though he did make a few disjointed statements that bear little 
relation to his petition for review but provide some insight 
into his overall mental condition.   For example, he told the 
IJ, “I don’t care what you say, I have perfectly got the right to 
initiate my children in life as a nation anytime I feel 
(indiscernible).”  (A.R. at 281.)  He also said, “don’t tell me 
about [the] crime of sex or whatever.  I know what to do to 
my children and how far to go, how to take it.  Do you 
understand that?”  (Id. at 281-82.)  Finally, he said “I don’t 
care about your ground rules.  I’m asking you do you 
understand as a nation I have the right to initiate my children 
in life.  Do you understand that?”  (Id. at 282.) 
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Council for Human Rights,2
 
 also testified during the hearing.  
She said that many mentally ill persons in Jamaica are 
prosecuted for minor offenses and are incarcerated, often 
indefinitely.  She also described the general experience of 
mentally ill inmates in Jamaican prisons, indicating that they 
are frequently subjected to physical and sexual abuse by both 
fellow prisoners and prison officials.  She said that “the most 
prevalent abuse is sexual,” but that mentally ill inmates also 
suffer other kinds of physical abuse because it “is easy to 
inflict on someone who is … on some medication.”  (Id. at 
316-17.)  Anderson believed that, if Roye were returned to 
Jamaica, he was “likely to be incarcerated for an indefinite 
period of time if he’s arrested,” and “would be exposed to 
abuse by guards and other inmates” while in prison.  (Id. at 
340-41.)   
 Anderson also testified regarding the extent to which 
Jamaican prison officials are involved in the abuse of 
mentally ill prisoners.  When asked to describe that 
involvement, Anderson replied: 
a lot of complaints … are of ill treatment at the 
hands of these correctional officers or warders. 
                                              
2 Anderson testified that the Independent Jamaican 
Council for Human Rights (the “Council”) is a non-
governmental organization whose mission is to “promote and 
protect the human rights of citizens of Jamaica.”  (A.R. at 
323.)  She explained that the Council provides services in 
three areas – “human rights education, advocacy where [the 
Council becomes] involved in dealing with the mentally ill in 
the criminal justice system, and … constitutional and legal 
reform.”  (Id. at 324.)  According to Anderson, one-third to 
one-half of the work of the Council involves the mentally ill.   
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… [T]hings are done that they must know about 
and they must be able to see, but they do 
nothing to prevent it or to assist … the mentally 
ill [inmates].  There are some warders … who 
will call me and say that this person is being 
abused, they don’t know by who, but I should 
come and have a look at the situation or I 
should send someone to speak to them, and -- 
but that -- those are few and far between.  I 
really believe that … I believe that some of the 
correctional officers themselves are abusing 
prisoners and a lot of them are turning a blind 
eye to what is going on. 
 
(Id. at 321.)   
 
 Dr. Wendel Abel, a physician who worked “with 
deportees with mental illness[es] … for almost 20 years” (id. 
at 349), and whose research involved “looking at the impact 
[of] deportation [on] persons who are mentally ill and who 
have been deported to Jamaica” (id. at 349-50), also testified 
during the hearing.  He said that mentally ill prisoners in 
Jamaica suffer “physical abuse, both by [prison] staff and also 
other prisoner[s,] so much so that [prison officials] have had 
to separate the mentally ill” from the remainder of the prison 
population.  (Id. at 372-73.)  He also said that mentally ill 
prisoners “are not allowed out at the same period of time [as 
prisoners who are not mentally ill] because [the] other 
prisoners will physically … and sexually abuse them.”  (Id. at 
373.)  
B. The IJ’s June 4, 2009 Decision 
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 On June 4, 2009, the IJ found that Roye was 
removable due to his felony convictions, but the IJ granted 
Roye’s request for deferral of removal under the CAT.  In 
that decision and order, the IJ summarized the evidence of 
record, specifically detailing the testimony of Anderson, 
Abel, and Weidman.  He gave particular emphasis to the 
testimony of Anderson and Abel, noting that they “verified 
that mentally ill detainees and prisoners are often sexually 
and physically assaulted in the Jamaican prison system 
because of the nature of their mental illness … .”  (Id. at 177.)  
He also credited Anderson’s assertion that “the high incident 
rate of sexual assaults against [mentally ill detainees and 
prisoners] is well known to the Jamaican government who 
essentially refuses to take the necessary action to punish the 
guards responsible.”  (Id.) 
 
 Based on the evidence, the IJ found that 
 
[t]he only reasonable and fact-based conclusion 
… is that [Roye] will be homeless in Jamaica 
due to a lack of family ties there.  He will 
decompensate due to a lack of needed 
medications for his anti-psychotic behavior.  He 
has a history of violence while off his 
medications, and even while on the 
medications, continues to exhibit anti-social 
behavior.  [Roye] at times refused to 
acknowledge his mental disease, and sometimes 
refuses to take his medicines.  As Dr. Abel 
opined, even in the best of circumstances, 
which are highly unlikely to prevail, [Roye] will 
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likely be detained in prison and thereby suffer 
sexual and physical assaults … .[3
  
]  
(Id. at 178.)  The IJ also found that the evidence demonstrated 
that Roye’s prospective persecutors would physically and 
sexually assault him with “the specific intent to inflict severe 
pain or suffering, i.e. … the goal or purpose of inflicting 
severe pain or suffering.”  (Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  
 
C. The BIA’s October 29, 2009 Opinion and Order 
 
 The DHS appealed the IJ’s order, arguing that “the 
Immigration Court erred as a matter of law when it found 
[Roye] will be subject to torture by or through the 
acquiescence of Jamaican prison guards, if removed to 
Jamaica.”  (Id. at 161.)  On October 29, 2009, the BIA 
sustained the appeal and ordered Roye to be removed.   
 
 Based on its examination of the record, the BIA 
concluded that Roye had failed to “[meet] his burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it is 
more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to 
                                              
3 It is not clear what in Dr. Abel’s testimony the IJ was 
relying on to say that Roye will likely be imprisoned.  When 
asked “what’s the likelihood of Mr. Roye ending up in a 
prison by being taken off the street by the police,” Dr. Abel 
responded that Roye “probably would not end up in [a 
Jamaican] prison unless he has been charged for an offense” 
(A.R. at 370), but the doctor predicted that Roye would 
“probably end up homeless and more than likely … die very 
soon on the street.”  (Id. at 369-70.) 
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Jamaica, either through the government inflicting or 
instigating the feared torture, or because the government 
would consent or acquiesce to such torture.”  (Id. at 118.)  
Significantly, the BIA “credit[ed] the testimony of [the three 
witnesses who testified at the May 26, 2009 hearing] and 
accept[ed] their testimony as an accurate depiction of what 
likely would occur upon [Roye’s] return to Jamaica.”  (Id. at 
117.)  However, even crediting that testimony, the BIA 
determined that the evidence of record did not “establish[] 
that the government of Jamaica has the specific intent to 
torture [Roye], as required for a grant of deferral of removal 
under the [CAT].”  (Id.)  The BIA explained that, “even if 
Jamaican government officials were to place [Roye] in 
indefinite detention despite being aware that [Roye] would be 
likely to suffer physical and sexual abuse in prison, as 
maintained by [Roye’s] witnesses, such action would not, by 
itself, establish that they possess the motive or purpose of 
torturing [Roye].”  (Id.)  
 
 The BIA also rejected the assertion that the Jamaican 
government would consent to or acquiesce in Roye’s abuse 
by other prisoners or prison guards.  In doing so, it explained 
that, under the governing law, to prove that Roye will be 
tortured “by or through the acquiescence of Jamaican” 
officials (id. at 161), Roye would have to “do more than show 
that the officials are simply aware of the activity constituting 
torture yet are powerless to stop it” (id. at 117; cf. id. at 118 
(stating that “mere willful blindness to, or deliberate 
ignorance of, the tortuous acts of others is insufficient to 
constitute acquiescence by public officials” (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).  The BIA went on to say that 
Roye must show that “the public official[s], prior to the 
activity constituting torture, [had] awareness of such activity 
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and thereafter breached [their] legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity.”  (Id. at 117 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).)   
 
 On May 26, 2010, Roye filed a petition for review of 
the order of removal and a motion seeking a stay of removal 
pending the resolution of that petition.4
 
  The government 
subsequently moved to remand the matter to the BIA to allow 
the BIA to reconsider Roye’s petition in light of our decision 
in Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d 
260 (3d Cir. 2010).  On June 4, 2010, we granted Roye’s 
request to stay the BIA’s order of removal, and on October 
22, 2010, we granted the government’s motion to remand.   
D. The BIA’s May 14, 2011 Opinion and Order 
 
 On remand, a divided BIA again sustained the DHS’s 
appeal.5
                                              
4 On December 2, 2009, Roye filed a petition for 
review of the BIA’s October 29, 2009 decision.  We 
dismissed that petition as untimely on March 3, 2010.  
Thereafter, on March 16, 2010, Roye filed a motion with the 
BIA, asking the BIA to reissue its October 29, 2009 decision 
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the 
BIA granted on May 17, 2010.  Hence, the May 26, 2010 
petition was timely. 
  In its March 14, 2011 opinion, the BIA observed 
 5 One Board member dissented, arguing that remand 
was appropriate “for more specific fact-finding,” because, 
“[i]n light of Kaplun, [there] appears to be a question of fact 
as to whether prison officials would commit sexual assaults 
on [Roye] for the specific purpose of inflicting severe pain or 
suffering (or would acquiesce in assaults by others for that 
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that, under Kaplun, “the question of the future likelihood of 
torture is a mixed one, with both a factual component (i.e., 
what is likely to happen to the petitioner if [he is] removed) 
and a legal one (i.e., does what is likely to happen amount to 
the legal definition of torture).”  (A.R. at 3 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).)  The BIA decided that, 
under the standards articulated in Kaplun, there was “no clear 
error in the [IJ’s] factual determination of what is likely to 
happen to [Roye] if he is returned to Jamaica,” but the BIA 
“reaffirm[ed] [its] prior … determination that what is likely to 
happen to [Roye] upon his return to Jamaica does not satisfy 
the legal definition of torture for purposes of [granting] 
deferral of removal” under the CAT.  (Id. at 4.)   
 
 It based that conclusion on its “determination that, 
upon de novo review, the evidence does not establish that 
[Roye] would be imprisoned by Jamaican authorities for the 
specific purpose of torturing him.”  (Id.)  It said that, under 
Pierre v. Attorney General of the United States, 528 F.3d 180, 
189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), “proof of knowledge on the part 
of government officials that severe pain or suffering will be a 
practically certain result of an applicant’s detention does not 
                                                                                                     
purpose).”  (A.R. at 5.)  The dissenting Board member argued 
that the IJ had not explained why Roye satisfied the CAT’s 
specific intent requirement.  Although the dissenter said, 
“[s]ome evidence in the record suggests that sexual assaults 
are committed on prisoners who are less likely to report the 
abuse,” he went on to say that the evidence does not shed 
light on “whether such assaults are committed to satisfy the 
sexual urges of the offenders (regardless of the level of harm 
to the victims) or whether the specific goal of the assault[s] is 
to inflict severe pain or suffering.”  (Id.) 
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satisfy the specific intent [requirement] of the [CAT].”  (Id.)  
Rather, the BIA stated, “the specific intent requirement 
requires an applicant to show that his prospective torturer will 
have the motive or purpose to cause him pain or suffering.”  
(Id.)  The BIA also rejected the assertion that Jamaican prison 
officials would consent to or acquiesce in Roye’s 
mistreatment.  That conclusion was based on its 
understanding that the evidence Roye offered that Jamaican 
prison “officials … turn[] a blind eye” to the physical and 
sexual abuse of mentally ill prisoners was insufficient to 
prove that “the Jamaican government possesses the requisite 
specific intent to torture [Roye] … .”  (Id.; see id. (noting that 
“mere willful blindness to, or deliberate ignorance of, the 
torturous acts of others is insufficient to constitute 
acquiescence by public officials” (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)6
                                              
6 The BIA also briefly addressed whether another 
intervening decision, Kang v. United States Attorney General, 
611 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2010), affected Roye’s case.  It 
determined that Kang did not alter its October 29, 2009 
decision because, unlike the petitioner in that case, who 
offered “affidavits from similarly situated individuals, 
including members of her organization, detailing their 
detention and torture, and testimony and an affidavit 
concerning police beatings and [the] torture of her son to 
elicit information about the alien,” Roye failed to “provide[] 
affidavits or substantially similar evidence that would serve to 
establish that the government of Jamaica would imprison 
[him] with the specific intent of torturing him.”  (A.R. at 5.) 
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 Roye timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s 
March 14, 2011 decision.7
 
   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 Because the basis for Roye’s removal is his conviction 
for an aggravated felony, “our jurisdiction is limited under the 
REAL ID Act ‘to constitutional claims or questions of law’” 
raised by his appeal.  Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  The 
phrase “questions of law” refers to purely legal inquiries such 
as those involved in statutory interpretation, Jarbough v. Att’y 
Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007), or inquiries into 
“whether the BIA used the correct standard in reviewing the 
IJ’s decision and whether [the BIA] assigned to [the 
petitioner] the correct burden of proof,” Tran v. Gonzales, 
447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2006).  “[C]onstitutional claims,” 
constitute, at minimum, “colorable violation[s] of the United 
States Constitution.”  Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 189.  “[F]actual 
or discretionary determinations are outside of our scope of 
review.”  Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184.    
 
 We review de novo the constitutional and legal 
questions raised by Roye’s petition, Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 
650 F.3d 968, 977 (3d Cir. 2010), though our review is 
“subject to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984),” Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184.  Because the BIA did not 
summarily affirm the IJ’s order but instead issued a separate 
                                              
7 On September 9, 2011, the government filed a 
motion to remand, along with its answering brief.  We denied 
the government’s motion to remand on October 6, 2011.  
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opinion, we review the BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s 
ruling only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.  Chavarria v. 
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  
 
III. Discussion 
 
 Roye’s petition for review requires us to answer the 
following legal questions:  whether the BIA correctly applied 
the law in reviewing the IJ’s finding that Roye will be 
physically and sexually assaulted in a Jamaican prison by 
prisoners and prison guards who specifically intend to cause 
him pain or suffering; and whether the BIA applied the 
correct legal standard in reviewing the IJ’s finding that it is 
more likely than not that Jamaican public officials will 
consent to or acquiesce in assaults on Roye.8
                                              
 8 Presumably in response to the dissenting Board 
member’s opinion, see supra note 
  The answers to 
5, Roye also argues that the 
specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering is endemic to 
prison rape and that any such rape must therefore be seen as 
an act of torture, (Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 6 (“Mr. Roye 
argues that acts of sexual assaults, especially rape, in prison 
constitute torture… .”); Reply Br. at 12 (noting that “[p]ursuit 
of [t]he question of whether sexual assault is primarily about 
sexual gratification or power and control … .  would be 
inappropriate because neither possibility should undermine 
[Roye’s] argument that the sexual violence [in prison] and its 
consequences would be specifically intended.”); id. (noting 
that “the severe pain and suffering [endemic to rape] cannot 
merely be an accidental consequence” of rape)).  While we 
certainly agree with Roye that rape is a reprehensible and all-
too-common crime, the regulatory definition of “torture” for 
purposes of applying the CAT appears to undermine his 
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these questions turn largely on the language of the CAT and 
its implementing regulations, as well as our precedents. 
 
                                                                                                     
demand for a rule that assumes the specific intent of all 
rapists.  See Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189 (holding that 
“[k]nowledge that pain and suffering will be the certain 
outcome of conduct may be sufficient for a finding of general 
intent but it is not enough for a finding of specific intent,” 
which is a prerequisite to relief under the CAT); Zubeda v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (observing that 
“[t]he severe pain and suffering endemic to rape is a 
necessary but not sufficient element of torture under the 
[CAT]” and that the intent of the rapist has to be considered).  
Ultimately, however, it is unnecessary for us to reach this 
issue.  Although the BIA’s opinion is not entirely clear, it 
seemed to accept the IJ’s finding that Roye’s “prospective 
[persecutors]” would physically and sexually assault him with 
“the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering, i.e. … 
the goal or purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering.” 
(A.R. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 4 
(noting the BIA’s conclusion that there was “no clear error in 
the [IJ’s] factual determination of what is likely to happen to 
[Roye] if he is returned to Jamaica”)).  The dissenting Board 
member questioned whether the IJ’s statement to that effect 
was adequately supported, see supra note 5, but, for purposes 
of this appeal, we assume that the factual statement regarding 
specific intent is sound.  Accordingly, Roye’s “all-rape-is-
torture” argument, while raising important public policy 
issues, need not be addressed. 
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A. The CAT 
  
 The CAT prohibits any signatory State from 
“expel[ling], return[ing] … or extradit[ing] a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”  Art. 3(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85.  The treaty became binding upon the United States when 
President Clinton delivered the ratifying documents to the 
U.N. in 1994.  U.N. Doc. 571 Leg/SER.E/13.IV.9 (1995).  It 
thereafter became “‘the policy of the United States not to 
expel … or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture … .’”  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, div. G., tit. XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note)). 
 
 Article I of the CAT defines torture as: 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or 
17 
 
acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.  It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
Art. 1(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
Under regulations promulgated by the United States 
Department of Justice,9 an alien who, like the petitioner here, 
seeks relief under the CAT, bears the burden of proving “that 
it is more likely than not that he or she [will] be tortured if 
removed … .”10
                                              
9 The FARRA implements the CAT.  Pub. L. No. 105-
277, div. G., tit. XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 note).  Pursuant to the FARRA, the 
Department of Justice promulgated regulations that govern 
the procedures by which aliens may obtain relief from 
removal under the CAT.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 
1999), codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), .17, & .18(a) (2004).   
  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see Auguste v. 
10 The regulations, which parallel the definition of 
torture in Article I of the CAT, define “torture” as  
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or her or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him or 
her for an act he or she or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third 
person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
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Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 149 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n evaluating 
[petitioner’s] claim that he is entitled to relief under the 
[CAT], we must apply the ‘more likely than not’ standard 
contained in 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).”); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002) (same).  Thus, an alien 
can show that he is entitled to relief under the CAT by 
proving that “it is more likely than not” that his persecutors 
will commit an act that causes severe physical or mental pain 
or suffering; that the pain or suffering will be intentionally 
inflicted; that it will be inflicted for an illicit or proscribed 
purpose; that it will be inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has 
custody or physical control of the alien; and that the pain or 
suffering does not arise from lawful sanctions.  Auguste, 395 
F.3d at 151.  If a petitioner demonstrates that he will be 
subjected to torture “by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of” a public official, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(1), then “withholding of removal or deferr[al] of 
removal is mandatory,” Silva-Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 64 (citing 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-.18.). 
 B. The Physical and Sexual Abuse of Mentally Ill 
 Prisoners in Jamaican Prisons 
 The IJ stated that the widespread physical and sexual 
abuse of mentally ill inmates in Jamaican prisons was 
specifically intended to cause severe pain and suffering.  The 
BIA did not disagree with that conclusion (see A.R. at 4 
                                                                                                     
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).   
19 
 
(accepting that there was “no clear error in the [IJ’s] factual 
determination of what is likely to happen to [Roye] if he is 
returned to Jamaica”)), but went on to reject Roye’s request 
for CAT relief because, inter alia, Roye had not demonstrated 
that he would “be imprisoned by Jamaican authorities for the 
specific purpose of torturing him,” (id.).  Roye contends that 
it was error for the BIA to focus on the intent of Jamaican 
public officials who decide to imprison someone with mental 
illness, instead of focusing on whether the physical and 
sexual abuse that mentally ill prisoners experience is intended 
to cause pain and so may qualify as torture.  He is correct. 
 
 During the May 26, 2009 hearing before the IJ, Roye 
offered the testimony of expert witnesses who opined that, if 
removed, he will be imprisoned and will be physically and 
sexually assaulted by guards and other inmates.  Specifically, 
Roye offered the testimony of Anderson, who said that 
mentally ill prisoners are frequently the victims of sexual 
abuse because they are easy targets for sexual predators (A.R. 
316-17), as well as the testimony of Dr. Abel, who said that 
the physical and sexual abuse of mentally ill inmates in 
Jamaican prisons is so pervasive that those inmates must be 
separated from the rest of the prison population (id. at 372-
73).  The IJ credited that testimonial evidence and concluded 
that, if removed, Roye would indeed be imprisoned11
                                              
11 As noted, supra note 3 and accompanying text, the 
IJ found that, if removed to Jamaica, Roye would likely stop 
taking his medications and, in his deteriorating mental state, 
would end up in prison.   
 and 
subjected to physical and sexual abuse by people specifically 
intending to cause him severe pain and suffering.  The BIA, 
as noted, did not disagree with those factual findings.  
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Nevertheless, battling a strawman, it rejected Roye’s CAT 
claim based on the fact that there was no indication that Roye 
would be imprisoned “by Jamaican authorities for the specific 
purpose of torturing him.”  (Id.)   
 
 No one had raised the question of Jamaican 
authorities’ intent regarding imprisonment because it is beside 
the point Roye was endeavoring to make.  Yet that is where 
the BIA chose to center its attention, saying, “proof of 
knowledge on the part of government officials that severe 
pain or suffering will be a practically certain result of an 
applicant’s detention does not satisfy the specific intent 
[requirement] of the [CAT] … .”  (Id.)  By concentrating its 
inquiry on whether the act of detaining mentally ill deportees 
is an act of torture, rather than on whether the physical and 
sexual abuse of mentally ill prisoners that occurs in Jamaican 
prisons rises to the level of torture, the BIA incorrectly 
analyzed Roye’s claim for relief.  Thus, although the BIA 
articulated the correct legal standard for specific intent in a 
CAT case, see Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189 (holding that specific 
intent requires more than “proof of knowledge on the part of 
government officials that severe pain or suffering will be the 
practically certain result” of the actions challenged as torture), 
it applied it to the wrong question, ignoring the IJ’s finding 
on specific intent and bypassing consideration of whether the 
physical and sexual assaults that Roye is likely to experience 
during a term of incarceration in a Jamaican prison rise to the 
level of torture under the CAT.   
 
By focusing on the intent of public officials who may 
decide to imprison Roye, the BIA failed to attend to Roye’s 
actual argument regarding the intent of those who will likely 
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assault him.  That failure requires us to grant Roye’s petition 
for review.   
 
C. Alleged Consent to or Acquiescence in Acts of 
 Torture  
 
 Roye contends that he is also entitled to relief under 
the CAT because Jamaican officials have turned a blind eye 
to the pervasive assaults in their prisons and are thus 
consenting to or acquiescing in torture.  He argues that, in this 
instance, the BIA understood the question but applied the 
wrong legal standard.  More specifically, he contends that the 
BIA erred in holding that “mere willful blindness to, or 
deliberate ignorance of, the torturous acts of others is 
insufficient to constitute acquiescence by public officials.”  
(Petitioner’s Br. at 24 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  Roye also argues that the BIA inappropriately 
conflated the mens rea necessary to prove that public officials 
consent to or acquiesce in acts of torture with the mens rea 
necessary to prove that public officials themselves have 
committed acts of torture.  He is correct on both counts. 
 
 Under the CAT and its implementing regulations, in 
order to prove that a public official will consent to or 
acquiesce in torture, an alien must demonstrate that “the 
public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, [had] 
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach[ed] his or her 
legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”12
                                              
12 Roye also asserts that because “acts committed in 
government custody must implicate either direct commission 
or acquiescence by the government,” the BIA erroneously 
concluded that the evidence fails to demonstrate that 
  8 
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C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).  Although that language suggests that 
public officials must have actual knowledge of torture for it to 
be said that they consent to or acquiesce in it, we held in 
Silva-Rengifo that “the [CAT’s] definition of ‘acquiescence’ 
includes both actual knowledge and ‘willful blindness.’”  473 
F.3d at 68.  We reasoned that a showing of willful blindness13
                                                                                                     
Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in his 
torture.  (Petitioner’s Br. at 30.)  We lack the authority to 
address that issue, however, because whether Jamaican public 
officials will consent to or acquiesce in his torture is 
essentially a factual question.  In Kaplun, we made that much 
clear by holding that the BIA committed an error of law by 
reviewing the IJ’s finding that “public officials would consent 
or acquiesce to [the] mistreatment of [the petitioner]” under 
the de novo standard of review instead of the clearly 
erroneous standard of review.  602 F.3d at 272 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, even if the BIA’s factual 
findings regarding the issue of government consent or 
acquiescence are clearly erroneous, we do not have 
jurisdiction to say so.   
 
13 Although we explained that willful blindness is 
sufficient to demonstrate government consent to or 
acquiescence in torturous activity, we did not detail what we 
meant by the term “willful blindness.”  In Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) the 
Supreme Court described “willful blindness” as follows:  
[C]ourts applying the doctrine of willful 
blindness hold that defendants cannot escape 
the reach of … [the law] by deliberately 
shielding themselves from clear evidence of 
critical facts that are strongly suggested by the 
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is sufficient to demonstrate government acquiescence in 
torture because “[e]vidence that officials turn a blind eye to 
certain groups’ torturous conduct is no less probative of 
government acquiescence” than evidence that such officials 
participate in acts of torture.  Id. at 70.  Thus, under Silva-
Rengifo, acquiescence to torture can be found when 
government officials remain willfully blind to torturous 
conduct and thereby breach their legal responsibility to 
prevent it.  Id. 
 
 Here, the BIA relied on a contrary understanding of 
the law.  In its May 14, 2011 opinion, it accepted the IJ’s 
                                                                                                     
circumstances.  The traditional rationale for this 
doctrine is that defendants who behave in this 
manner are just as culpable as those who have 
actual knowledge. 
… 
[A] 1962 proposed draft of the Model Penal 
Code, which has since become official, 
attempted to incorporate the doctrine [of willful 
blindness] by defining knowledge of the 
existence of a particular fact to include a 
situation in which a person is aware of a high 
probability of the fact’s existence, unless he 
actually believes that it does not exist. …  
[E]very Court of Appeals – with the possible 
exception of the District of Columbia Circuit … 
has fully embraced willful blindness, applying 
the doctrine to a wide-range of criminal statutes. 
Id. at 2068-69 (alteration deleted) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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factual finding that Jamaican prison officials “turn[] a blind 
eye to” the physical and sexual abuse of mentally ill 
prisoners.  (A.R. at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  The BIA also said, however, that willful blindness 
is insufficient to prove government consent to or 
acquiescence in torture.  It thus concluded that Roye had 
failed to demonstrate that Jamaican public officials will, for 
purposes of the CAT, be culpable for any assault he is likely 
to suffer in prison.  That holding ignores the import of Silva-
Rengifo and was therefore error.   
 
 The error of applying an incorrect rule of law was 
compounded when the BIA conflated the mens rea 
requirement pertaining to those who commit acts of torture 
(i.e., specific intent) with the minimum mens rea requirement 
pertaining to those who consent to or acquiescence in acts of 
torture committed by others (i.e., willful blindness).  As noted 
above, the BIA acknowledged that the record contained 
evidence that Jamaican officials deliberately ignore the rape 
of mentally ill prisoners.  Nevertheless, the BIA said that 
evidence of the government’s willful blindness is insufficient 
to demonstrate “that the Jamaican government possesses the 
requisite specific intent to torture.”  (Id. at 2.)  The BIA thus 
confused two distinct elements of a claim for relief under the 
CAT – i.e., torture versus consent to or acquiescence in 
torture – and further confused the mental states associated 
with each.  See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 151 (explaining that an 
alien seeking relief under the CAT must show both that 
“severe physical or mental pain or suffering” will be 
“intentionally inflicted” and that it will be inflicted “by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official who has custody or physical control of the 
victim”).  Again, Roye adduced evidence tending to prove 
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that, if removed, he will be physically and sexually assaulted 
in prison and that Jamaican prison officials will turn a blind 
eye to that severe mistreatment.  Instead of examining those 
two issues separately, as controlling precedent requires, see 
id., the BIA mixed them together, saying that evidence that 
the Jamaican government is willfully blind to the 
mistreatment of mentally ill prisoners could not prove 
specific intent to cause pain and suffering.14
                                              
14 The specific intent and willful blindness inquiries 
are not necessarily unrelated.  To be culpable under the CAT, 
government officials must, at a minimum, be willfully blind 
to “activity constituting torture” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7), so it 
may not be enough for someone seeking CAT relief to say 
that officials are willfully blind to rape.  In some fashion the 
evidence may have to support the conclusion that the officials 
are willfully blind to rape that constitutes torture.  Cf. Silva-
Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 68 n.8 (noting that the drafting history of 
the CAT includes “text suggested by the United States 
[which] would have defined ‘public official’ … to include 
those who ‘fail to take appropriate measures to prevent or 
suppress torture when such person has knowledge or should 
have knowledge that torture has or is being committed and 
has the authority or is in a position to take such measures … 
.” (quoting J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture 4-42 (1988))); id. (citing 
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003), for 
the proposition that “Congress has made clear that the correct 
inquiry under the Convention is whether an applicant can 
show that public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to 
the torture of their citizens by third parties.”).  In other words, 
some intent evidence associated with the alleged rapes may 
be required.  Cf. Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473 (observing that 
  Merging those 
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inquiries was an error of law that requires us to grant Roye’s 
petition for review.15
                                                                                                     
“[t]he severe pain and suffering endemic to rape is a 
necessary but not sufficient element of torture under the 
[CAT]” and that the intent of the rapist has to be considered).  
We do not, however, need to decide that question in this case. 
  
15 Roye also contends that the BIA erred by failing to 
conduct the three-step inquiry articulated in Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001), before denying his 
application for deferral of removal on the grounds that he 
failed to present sufficient corroborating evidence in support 
of his claim for relief under the CAT.  (Petitioner’s Br. at 25.)  
We disagree.  Roye’s argument is predicated upon a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the BIA’s opinion.  As the 
government correctly notes in its brief, the BIA did not 
sustain the DHS’s appeal because Roye failed to corroborate 
his own testimony or the testimony of one of the witnesses 
who testified during the May 26, 2009 hearing.  Instead, the 
BIA said that Roye failed to put forth “affidavits or 
substantially similar evidence that would serve to establish 
that the government of Jamaica would imprison [him] with 
the specific intent of torturing him.”  (A.R. at 5.)  The BIA 
distinguished his case from that of the petitioner in Kang, 
who offered “affidavits from similarly situated individuals … 
detailing their detention and torture, and testimony and an 
affidavit concerning police beatings and [the] torture of her 
son to elicit information about the” petitioner, (A.R. at 5).  In 
other words, the BIA did not say that Roye failed to 
corroborate his claim – it just made clear that Roye failed to 
put forth evidence sufficient to satisfy the CAT’s specific 
intent requirement, as the petitioner did in Kang.  Thus, even 
if none of the testimonial or documentary evidence that Roye 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
 Because the BIA answered the wrong question and 
applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing Roye’s 
claims for deferral of removal under the CAT, we will grant 
his petition for review, vacate the BIA’s May 14, 2011 
opinion and order, and remand the matter to the BIA.  On 
remand, the BIA should review the IJ’s conclusion that the 
evidence of record demonstrates that Roye’s persecutors will 
physically and sexually abuse him in a manner that rises to 
the level of torture under the CAT, and decide whether 
Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in any 
such abuse.16
                                                                                                     
presented to the IJ required corroboration, the BIA decided 
that the evidence did not prove that the Jamaican government 
would imprison Roye with the specific intent to cause him 
pain or suffering.  As we have already described, that ruling is 
flawed, but not because, as Roye argues, the BIA’s 
conclusion “departs from the required three-step inquiry 
[articulated in Abdulai] by creating an additional requirement 
for a specific type of evidence.”  (Petitioner’s Br. at 25.) 
  
16 In its Answering Brief, the government argues that 
remand is appropriate to give the BIA the opportunity to 
“analyze, in light of Yusupov, 650 F.3d 968, whether the 
immigration judge’s finding regarding specific intent was a 
finding of fact, subject to clear error review.”  (Respondent’s 
Br. at 17.)  However, because remand is appropriate due to 
the legal errors discussed above, we do not address the 
government’s assertion that we should remand to allow the 
BIA to determine whether the IJ’s finding that Roye’s 
oppressors will physically and sexually abuse him with the 
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specific intent to cause him pain or suffering is a finding of 
fact. 
